28 June 2008

Oil, Food and Economics - Sumita Kale

If the subprime crisis wasn’t bad enough, the oil price spike has unnerved the world this year. And with food and fuel prices soaring in all countries, the policy prescriptions are back to the standard myopic solutions of interest rate hikes, duty cuts, export curbs etc. But if we step back and try to see the larger picture to decipher what these prices are signalling, what do we find? One theory that has finally got the prominence it has deserved is the Peak Oil Theory. In fact, for Matt Simmons, energy investment banker and ‘Peak Oil’ theorist, the signs that crude was entering danger zones have been clear since 1989, but it was only post 2002 when China kick started its explosive growth that the situation became bleak. For most of the world though, peak oil has become a keyword only recently because of the rapid rise in the oil price this year. According to Simmons, it was the unplanned for growth from developing countries that has taken up 99 percent of spare capacity and which has continued despite a ten fold rise in prices. Of course, to a large extent consumers are insulated from international oil prices : Price increases from about the $60 level have not been passed on to consumers, especially in the developing countries. State revenues are being sacrificed and/or consumers are being insulated by subsidies. To begin with, the true extent of oil reserves in the world remains an unknown; the rising share of state-owned oil companies has led to secrecy on reserves data. Spare supply capacity is fuzzy and this explains the frenzied rise in prices currently as there is a paranoia that is gripping the market. In short, supply constraints are more than likely to stay, than disappear. There are also various industry issues such as aging oil wells, rising costs of extraction, chronic rig and skilled manpower shortages etc. – the list is long. 80% of oil infrastructure needs to be rebuilt; the fresh demand for steel will in turn impact inflation. Simmons who has been anticipating this for long now says that the world has to go on a ‘war footing’ now and force a change in consumption pattern – the current trend is just not sustainable. What about food prices? At a symposium convened in March by the Banque de France, Martin Redrado, Governor of the Central Bank of Argentina, was spot on when he said that the rising inflation is to a large extent due to the ‘convergence’ of consumption levels – the developing countries are catching up in consumption patterns (growth in auto demand etc.) and change in dietary habits at a time when there is a delicate balance between production and demand. Two unanticipated impacts on the already delicate balance between supply and demand have had an impact on prices. The first is climate change reducing global grain output (droughts in Australia and Ukraine etc.); and the second is the impact of high crude prices in diverting grain for bio-fuel production that has triggered off the rising prices in corn, soya, wheat etc. Since food contributes a significant portion of consumer budgets in emerging economies, this will show up in forthcoming wage revisions, putting more pressure on prices. Higher energy and food prices will impact growth via higher interest rates that are being forced upwards in an attempt to curb the price rises. Redrado’s paper has interesting policy implications as it throws a spotlight on the social and political tensions that will arise as countries are forced into a period of lower growth and higher inflation. Per capita consumption of food and crude oil is much lower in China and India, than in the US- to bet on a slowdown in these economies, therefore, has social ramifications as well. On the other side, high oil prices are causing prosperity in oil-rich countries, the recent debate over sovereign wealth funds is just one instance of the political implications of this growing wealth. Prices may settle this year or the next, already there is relief coming in on the wheat front with better output forecast in Australia this year. Relief on the oil front though at this point seems doubtful. But all these problems hitting the world today highlight one important signal : you ignore the environment and natural resources at your peril. Would this have been the case if economics didn’t try so hard to distance itself from geography, sociology and other ‘soft’ disciplines? Trying to go deeper into this, I came across this interesting piece on Ecological Economics by Robert Constanza from the University of Vermont. “Ecological economics is a transdisciplinary effort to link the natural and social sciences broadly, and especially ecology and economics (Costanza 1991). The goal is to develop a deeper scientific understanding of the complex linkages between human and natural systems, and to use that understanding to develop effective policies that will lead to a world which is ecologically sustainable, has a fair distribution of resources (both between groups and generations of humans and between humans and other species), and efficiently allocates scarce resources including “natural” and “social” capital. This requires new approaches that are comprehensive, adaptive, integrative, multiscale, pluralistic, evolutionary and which acknowledge the huge uncertainties involved. For example, if one's goals include ecological sustainability then one cannot rely on the principle of "consumer sovereignty" on which most conventional economic solutions are based, but must allow for co-evolving preferences, technology, and ecosystems (Norton et al. 1998). One of the basic organizing principles of ecological economics is thus a focus on this complex interrelationship between ecological sustainability (including system carrying capacity and resilience), social sustainability (including distribution of wealth and rights, social capital, and coevolving preferences) and economic sustainability (including allocative efficiency in the presence of highly incomplete and imperfect markets).” Sounds familiar to my previous post on Mukherjee’s ideas on what Economics should include. Clearly the need of the hour for us economists! Looking forward to a debate on this one! ********************** PS: This post includes valuable inputs from Suyodh Rao, (an economist based in Hyderabad, India)- thanks Suyodh, for all your mails about oil, food and water!

03 June 2008

Putting Short Term Stability Before Long Term Growth: Fifty Years Is Enough

by Ben Fine

This article has been published as a Policy Brief (No. 12) by the Intergovernmental Group of Twenty-Four on International Monetary Affairs and Development (G24). Blog authors are grateful to the G24 for allowing it to reproduce it; copyright remains with the G24.

It is fifty years since Jean-Jacques Polak published his classic article “Monetary Analysis of Income Formation and Payments Problems” in the IMF Staff Papers. This paper provided the theoretical basis for the IMF’s financial programming, and continues to do so today. This is remarkable in and of itself. The world economy has gone through major changes over this period, as have corresponding fashions within economic theory as triumphant Keynesianism gave way to varieties of monetarism in the wake of the collapse of the post-war boom.

We also have had fifty years of development economics, during which there have also been shifting and competing perspectives from modernization through the Washington consensus and beyond, to notions of the developmental state, as attempts have been made to understand why the success of East Asian NICs should contrast so much with achievement elsewhere. Is it credible that across this material and intellectual ferment, the “Polak Model” should remain sacrosanct?

To his credit, Polak’s initial contribution was extraordinarily modest and qualified in its aims. He made it crystal clear that the main problem addressed is a temporary balance of payments deficit in a developing country, this gap usually the result of excessive domestic credit to fill the gap arising out of a fiscal deficit. He presumed that the only reliable data available are those concerning monetary variables, and that the only corresponding policy variable is control of the domestic money supply.

The model only seeks to determine the level of nominal income, with its distribution between the output level and the price level to be determined by some other means. In this respect, in principle, the model is not monetarist since it must violate one or other of the assumptions that prices are fixed (at the world level) or that output is fixed (at full employment). In practice, not without justification, financial programming is heavily associated with the ideology of monetarism because of the pessimistic stance taken on productive potential.

It has targeted balance of payments and/or fiscal deficits with shifting instruments across countries and over time as fixed exchange rates have given way to floating exchange rates, and control of inflation and liberalization of money markets have been emphasized more or less to suit. Today, for example, the IMF is more likely to advise appreciation of the exchange rate to bring down inflation in middle-income countries than to address foreign or fiscal deficits, although these remain a priority for low-income countries, especially in Africa.

One criticism of Polak is his making virtue out of necessity. Even if monetary variables are the only ones that can be measured and controlled, they are not necessarily best for remedial action. A patient with a broken leg is not best treated with a thermometer to take temperature and aspirin to bring it down, even if these are all that is available in the hospital. This apart, Polak can be judged to have appropriately sought, but failed, to constrain the use of his model for purposes for which it was not designed.

He did, for example, refine the model, in a joint article in 1971, by adding extra variables and equations. But, as was explicitly recognized within this contribution, this was nothing more than an elaboration of the Hicksian IS-LM-BP model, standard across every undergraduate textbook.

This prompts three observations. First and foremost, such a model was constructed in the context of developed countries, raising doubts over applicability to developing countries. Second, as has remained the case throughout the life of financial programming, the model cannot address issues of development as its scope is confined to the so-called short run, over which everything to do with development is taken as fixed. Third, it is ironic that the Polak model began to embrace Keynesianism explicitly just as the approach was falling into disrepute with the stagflation of the 1970s.

Significantly, in the second half of the 1980s, the IMF did seek theoretically to reconcile growth or development objectives with short-run macroeconomic adjustment in proposing a marriage between its Polak model and the World Bank’s growth model. Three further observations follow.

First, the model was fundamentally flawed, bound by export pessimism (as if the world economy did not grow) and leading to declining levels of productivity increase over time. In other words, it remained heavily bound to the short run, and essentially to zero per capita growth in the long run. Second, ironically, this was when new growth theory had begun to flourish, suggesting how productivity increase could be generated over time, but the marriage model was bound to old growth theory in which productivity increase is exogenously determined. And, third, Polak reacted strongly against any attempt to forge a marriage between financial programming (confined and only appropriate to the short run) and growth theory. Indeed, in a personal communication commenting on the marriage model, Polak suggests:

My view is that it is not a worthwhile project, and each subject should be approached on its own, provided the practitioners are fully aware of any recommended policies on the other objective (which to be sure has not always been the case between the Fund and the Bank). A possible simile, somewhat limping of course: the jobs of a schoolteacher and a paediatrician are both to do good to a child, and each should be aware of the other … but the professions should remain specialised for greatest efficiency in each field.

This is well and good as far as it goes, but it neatly sidesteps what has been a major criticism of the stabilization policies of the IMF and the structural adjustment policies of the World Bank, the negative impact of what is adopted in the short run on longer run performance. The latter is better seen as attached to an evolving economy over time, rather than as some given equilibrium around which appropriate policies are targeted. Polak, and his model, simply do not address this issue as he is only too aware.

The recent turn to poverty reduction has intensified the failure to observe the reservations that Polak has expressed over the use of his model. The first, and, for some time, the only model underpinning PRSPs uses financial programming as its organizing framework. It does so while assuming that there is a single labour market and full employment, thereby, for the convenience of the model, abolishing the major sources of poverty – unemployment and low wages -- in one stroke. This is even justified on the grounds that the model is universally and conveniently applicable across all countries.

It is certainly not the case that the Polak model for financial programming determines IMF policy. Indeed, it allows for considerable discretion. But it does set a framework within which policy is discussed, one which prioritizes the short term over the long run, and financial functioning and targets over the traditional concerns of development. It is time for a fundamental rethink and a new framework – one both recognizing, rather than subordinating itself to, increasing financial volatility, and genuinely engaging adjustment with developmental goals, with poverty alleviation and growth as starting points, rather than add-ons.

For a fuller discussion, see Ben Fine, "Financial Programming and the IMF", in B. Fine and K.S. Jomo (eds), The New Development Economics: After the Washington Consensus, Dehli: Tulika and London: Zed Press

Ben Fine is Professor of Economics at the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, and Director of the Centre for Economic Policy for Southern Africa at SOAS. Recent books include “Social Capital versus Social Theory: Political Economy and Social Science at the Turn of the Millennium” (2001); “Development Policy in the Twenty-First Century: Beyond the Post-Washington Consensus” (2001); “The World of Consumption: The Material and Cultural Revisited” (2002); “Marx's Capital” fourth edition (2004); and “The New Development Economics: A Critical Introduction” (2006). His research interests include "economic imperialism" or the relationship between economics and other social sciences, especially social capital; the material and cultural determinants of consumption, particularly food; privatisation and industrial policy; and development theory and policy.

27 May 2008

Jobless growth, a new impediment to development


by Codrina Rada
Following the lost decades of the 1970s and 1980s, during which many developing economies recorded extended periods of output decline, the economic profession has seen a renewed interest in the debate about what drives economic growth. Much of the mainstream academic work on the issue has been focused on those classic factors that foster capital accumulation and productivity growth -- savings, human capital or technological change. Nothing surprising here since the theoretical basis had already been well-established by the Solow model of growth, versatile enough to accommodate the sustainable take off of yet a few more academic careers. Unfortunately, there wasn’t much sustainability for development and therefore for many in poverty in the policy prescriptions derived from such models. 

Empirical evidence shows that strong labor productivity growth is not anymore sufficient to solve problems of acute poverty or underdevelopment. For the last decade or so many developing economies have claimed good economic performance but oddly enough growth has not led to a substantial decline in the underutilized labor force. In fact the informal sector in most of the developing countries has been on the rise. Global Employment Trends, a 2004/5 report from the International Labor Organization and Key Indicators from the Asian Development Bank’s 2005 report on Asian economies show that “out of a total labor force of 1.7 billion in the DMCs[1], around 500 million are underutilized in terms of being either unemployed or underemployed…” (ADB 2005)[2]; “during the 1990s, own-account and family workers[3] represented nearly two-thirds of the total non-agricultural labor force in Africa, half in South Asia, a third in Middle East…”; “In Latin America the urban informal economy was the primary job generator during the 1990s....urban informal employment in Africa was estimated to absorb about 60 per cent of the urban labour force and generate more than 93 per cent of all new jobs in the region in the 1990s” (ILO 2005).

 The problem with the jobless growth phenomenon in the developing countries is two-fold. First, efforts to fight wide-spread poverty levels are destined to fail unless jobs are created for the many unemployed and poor. As Fields (2004) points out “poor are poor because they earn little from the work they do”[4]. And if growth does not produce high-productivity, high-pay jobs, its purpose to foster development and alleviate poverty, will eventually be defeated. Secondly, economic history suggests that sustainable growth is associated with structural changes towards secondary and tertiary sectors, shifts in sectoral employment from low to high-productivity sectors and changing patterns of specialization towards higher value-added products (UN 2006). For economists and policy makers alike these recent trends pose a significant challenge: strong productivity growth generates unwanted social and economic outcomes i.e. under and unemployment.

This is not to say that productivity growth is unwelcome. On the contrary, it remains the essential ingredient for long-run growth. But it will fail to produce development unless outcomes, such as the jobless growth and lack of structural change, are addressed by policy. Generally speaking the solution to this dilemma is a matter of successful implementation of both pro-growth as well as socially relevant economic policies.

While there are many dimensions policies should address I want to refer here to few which I think are essential. Strategies can be thought of based on their target: vulnerable groups, distributive issues, inadequate demand and anemic structural changes. First of all, households in the informal sector are especially vulnerable because they lack a steady income flow and often fall outside the social safety net system. In the short-run an economic shock or natural disaster reinforces development and poverty traps as resources are usually insufficient to distribute to all those in need. In the long run consequences for development are substantial as these groups lack adequate access to education, health care and consequently economic opportunities. Finally, economic insecurity for extended periods of time is conducive to political instability which is likely to put a check on investment and therefore economic growth. Institutional changes and policies which target the most vulnerable groups in a society become essential (see 2008 World Economic and Social Survey, UN, DESA).

 Second, there is the issue of how to distribute the gains from economic expansion. This is a delicate matter from both a socio-political and an economic perspective. On the social and political side, redistributive measures are often resisted by those in the formal sector who are asked to give up part of their income. In fact a large informal sector may make it impossible for the government to implement any redistributive measures without strangling expansion in the formal sector or facing serious political opposition from the affluent part of the society. From an economic point of view, redistribution has to take into account how different economic classes behave in terms of their consumption and investment patterns, otherwise growth may be adversely affected. Overall, redistribution is effective in the long-run only if it encourages the creation new productive activities.

 Third, strong productivity growth generates job loss when aggregate demand is insufficient. The 2006 World Economic and Social Survey suggests that the structural transformation from primary to secondary and finally tertiary sectors in the rapidly growing East Asian economies throughout the last few decades was supported a great deal by fixed investment. The core strategy is a classic example of Keynesianism and it calls for either an increase in domestic expenditures, investment or government expenditures, or for measures that would stimulate external demand, such as a competitive exchange rate policy. Either one should ultimately target the absorption of underutilized labor force.

 Finally, when structural change is anemic or in other words economic growth does not lead to changes in the basic configuration of the economy, policy should look to establish forward and backward linkages between different sectors of the economy, including the informal sector.


 Source: United Nations, World Economic and Social Survey 2006, UN, New York. Asian Development Bank, Key Indicators 2005: Labor Markets in Asia: Promoting Full, Productive, and Decent Employment International Labour Organization (2004), Employment Trends, ILO Geneva. [1] Developing Member Countries (DMC) of the Asian Development Bank [2] Where Asia’s labor force of 1.7 billion accounts for about 57.3% of the world’s total labor force (ADB 2005) [3] The two categories account for a broad definition of underemployment. ILO 2005 [4] The quotation by Fields (2004) is from the ADB (2005) report. Codrina Rada is Assistant Professor at the Department of Economics, University of Utah. Education: 2007, Ph.D. in Economics, New School for Social Research; 2005, M.Phil in Economics, New School University; 2000 MA in Sociology, University of Massachusetts, Boston, BA in Economics. Current research interests: ‘Jobless growth: A New Tale for the Global World’, ‘The Macroeconomics of Pensions’ and ‘Developing and Transition Economies in the Late 20th Century: Diverging Growth Rates, Economic Structures, and Sources of Demand’

13 May 2008

Bush, Rice and the Global Food Crisis

by Ashwini Deshpande George Bush and Condoleezza Rice recently suggested that the global food crisis is in large part due to the rising prosperity and the consequent increase in the demand for food by the Indian and Chinese middle classes. Coming from Bush, the likelihood of any statement being a smokescreen is extremely high (the world is still reeling from the devastating consequences of the WMD lie and its aftermath). In this case too, their argument is a smokescreen for some of the factors that the US leaders would prefer to not have under public scrutiny. One wonders why, though, since the US leaders and their policies have shown precious little regard, if any, to any international public opinion. In contrast to the ‘prosperity and rising food demand’ theory, consider this. The 1996 World Food Summit resolved to reduce the number of hungry people in the world by half by the end of 2015. By 2006, there were more hungry people in the developing world (820 m) than in 1996. According the FAO, instead of decreasing, the number of hungry people in the world is increasing at the rate of 4 million a year. Keeping the 1996 pledge would require decreasing the number of undernourished by 31 million every year, which would mean increasing the food consumption of the hungry. The World Bank has estimated that approximately 100 million people have fallen into poverty in the last two years due to rising food prices and that this trend is unlikely to be reversed any time soon. Food prices are expected to remain high through 2015. High prices threaten to increase malnutrition, already a cause of premature death of children in many countries. The worst-hit are the countries of sub-Saharan Africa, as they collectively import 45% of their wheat needs and 84% of their rice. But according to Bush and Rice, the food shortage in the world is being caused by the fact that two large developing economies are eating more and more. How true is this? According to the FAO, of the projected 582 million undernourished in 2015, 203 would be in South Asia alone, i.e. close to 35 percent. So, for every Indian who, by eating more, is supposedly pushing up food prices, there are hundreds who remain undernourished. Mr. Bush and Ms. Rice, just imagine the horror that would unleash if their hunger was either reduced or eradicated altogether! Indians and Chinese are not merely consumers of food grains, they produce them too. Take rice. India is the second largest rice grower in the world behind China. Rice being the staple of over 65% of the Indian population, much of the production is consumed domestically. Rice prices in India have been rising and due to the low purchasing power of the poor, even a small increase can cause a decline in their real incomes. The fact is that agricultural growth has not kept pace with overall rate of growth and it is believed that there might be other factors such as overuse of fertilisers and so forth that might put a question mark on the sustainability of rice production. Thus, while a section of the Indian population might be prospering (but not necessarily consuming more rice), it is certainly true that large sections of the poor would join the ranks of the malnourished due to increasing rice prices, especially, if current levels of rice production are unsustainable. Now let’s look at the other side of the picture that Bush and Rice are completely silent about. Rising oil prices and fears of climate change have led to a massive increase in the production of bio-fuels. The World Bank, by no means radical or left-wing, provides figures that establish how the encouragement of production and use of bio-fuels has led to increased demand for raw materials such as maize, wheat, soy and palm oil and increased competition for cropland. Almost all the increase in global maize production from 2004-07 (the period in which prices have been rising) went for bio-fuels production in the US. From 2004 to 2007, global maize production increased 51 million tons, bio fuel use in the US increased 50 million tons and global consumption for all other uses increased 33 million tons, which caused global stocks to decline by 30 million tons. Finally, when prices rise, just as many are hurt, some benefit. The World Bank has divided countries into large and moderate gainers (and conversely, losers) in terms of the impact of the food price increase on their trade balance. Large gainers would be those countries whose trade balance would improve by more than 1 percent of their 2005 GDP as a result of rising prices. Moderate gainers would be those countries whose trade balance would improve by less than 1 percent of their 2005 GDP. It turns out the largest losers are going to be several African countries. India and China are among the moderate losers. The USA, incidentally, would be moderate gainer. Of course, the distributional impact of high food prices can be serious even in countries where the balance of payments has not been adversely affected. A study for eight countries indicates that an increase in food prices between 2005 and 2008 has increased poverty by 3 percentage points. For several countries where the progress in poverty reduction has been slow, the increase in food prices threatens to wipe out gains in poverty reduction made in the last 5-10 years. Thus, the overall picture of the food crisis is a far cry from the “prosperous Indians and Chinese eating more” theory. Weather related shocks (drought in Australia) and rising oil prices have contributed to the rise in prices. But in large part, the crisis is due to the needs of the energy intensive US economy that Bush is committed to protect – even if millions have to go hungry in the rest of the world in order to sustain those needs.
***

Ashwini Deshpande is Professor of Economics at the Delhi School of Economics, University of Delhi, India.

ashwini.desh@gmail.com
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